General Giulio Douhet was an Italian army officer from 1882 to 1922 and one of the first significant proponents of air power. A controversial figure because he challenged the traditionalist, ground war generals--he was even courtmartialed and imprisoned for two years--he called for the creation of a large bomber force to destroy the enemy, claiming that the plane rendered ground targets and forces unnecessary. He outlined his theory in The Command of the Air published in 1921. Douhet argued that massive aerial bombing of urban targets would produce a psychological effect on the populace in which their morale would be broken and they would demand an end to hostilities or revolt against their government. Others picked up on or added to his theory, most notably Generals "Billy" Mitchell and Curtis LeMay of the United States and Air Marshal Arthur Harris of Great Britain.
Douhet died in 1930 so did not live to see his theory fail. Germany attempted to subdue England through the air during the Battle of Britain. The Royal Air Force and US Army Air Corps dropped almost 1.5 million tons of explosives on Germany and another million on Japan hoping to force a surrender. Around 7 million tons were dropped on targets in Southeast Asia during the Vietnam War. In none of these cases did the enemy surrender or revolt and, in the case of Vietnam, communist North Vietnam emerged victorious. Why? Air attacks, even with modern weaponry, is never as accurate as the military thinks they are. While air power is a significant force multiplier, in war only "boots on the ground" win wars. And then there is the psychological factor. Douhet's theory was based on destroying morale. Various studies have shown that while demoralizing, massive bombing campaigns rarely break morale when such attacks are expected and national leadership prepares properly for such attacks. Populations, with strong leaders, pull together to face the challenge. A comparison can be made with the siege tactics of early history. They were rarely successful and tended to be long, drawn out affairs.
So how does Douhet's failed theory connect with President Obama's drone strategy? The obvious connection is that they both focus on air assets, but there's more to it. Both are based on the assumption that a conflict can be won through the air. This is a desirable but unattainable outcome. Desirable because it would not put many, if any, of our men and women in harms way; and to some extent the attacker is isolated and santized from the event. As show in the examples above, it is unlikely that the desired outcome will happen for practical, psychological, and other reasons.
For all of the rhetoric during the 2008 election, reality set in for President-to-be Obama after his first CIA/top secret briefing. The war on terror had become his reality. In that briefing he learned things most Americans did not know and it shook him, as shown in the photos taken after the meeting (deer in the headlights look). He realized that immediately closing Gitmo was not a good idea. He realized that following the withdrawl timelines negotiated under Bush was wise policy. He realized that the country could not isolate itself from the threat of Islamic terrorism. This did not stop him from developing a method that would make him and other progressives "feel good" about killing the enemy. The solution--ramp up in a big way the drone strikes begun under his predecessor.
Data on the total number of drone strikes is difficult to obtain, but in terms of Pakistan and the war on al-Qaeda, there have been an estimated 354 drone stikes from 2004-2013. President Obama's drone strike strategy accounts for 314 or 87% of the total. Estimates vary but for every confirmed terrorist killed in these strikes there are between 35 and 50 civilian casualities. While the drone is a useful weapon on the modern battlefield, it has limitations, just like Douhet's strategic bombing theory had limitations. Unfortunately, too often the limitations are ignored for expediency.
One falacious belief about drone strikes is they are accurate. Obviously the data shows otherwise. Even conservative estimates show the ratio of enemy targets hit versus non-targets to be one to twenty or worse. A second misperception is that drones strikes are effective. It is difficult to confirm a target was eliminated unless there are boots on the ground. Reagan tried to take out Qadaffi from the air in 1986 but the Libyan leader had just left his compound. How many times was Osama bin-Laden supposed to be buried under a ton of rubble? The eminent military historian, John Keegan, made the same argument regarding startegic bombing in his classic survey of World War Two. Finally, there are more and more questions being raised about the legality of drone strikes. Most challenges coming from the UN, the international community, and the far left in Obama's own party.
Like so many policy areas, a balanced strategy that utilizes numerous methods and tactics is often best. Both strategic bombing and drones have a role to play in modern war, but they will not win the war alone. There are some timeless truths to war. Whether a Greek hoplite or modern rifleman, the infantry soldier carries about sixty pounds of gear into combat. Do not attack Russia in the winter. And most importantly, wars are won--even shadow wars fought in secret like the war on terror--by putting soldiers on the ground and looking the enemy in the eye. Weapons like the stealth bomber or Predator drone might allow policy makers to "feel better" about taking life, it might sanitize the experience, but it will not lead to success let alone victory. Although separated by one hundred years, both Douhet and Obama are wrong.
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